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Technological Neutrality:
Recalibrating Copyright in the
Information Age
Carys J. Craig*
This Article aims to draw the connection between how we conceptualize
legal rights over information resources and our capacity to develop
technologically neutral legal norms in the information age. More
specifically, it identifies and critically examines three competing
approaches to the idea of technological neutrality apparent in copyright
jurisprudence. Ultimately, it is argued that true technological neutrality
requires not simply the seamless expansion of legal rights into new
technological contexts, but the careful, contextual recalibration of rights
and interests in light of shifting values and changing circumstances.
As a normative principle, technological neutrality in copyright law
thus demands a nuanced and relational understanding of the rights
at play, and the social values that they seek to foster as technologies
evolve.

Introduction

If this is, indeed, the “information era” in which we find ourselves, then the
power to own, control, and access information is surely the power that will
define our era and determine our future. Just as control over the means of
*
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production shaped the emergence and evolution of industrial might, so too
must control over information determine the dynamics of postindustrial power.
The law, which ascribes rights and protects privileges in relation to valuable
resources, plays a key role in both allocating power and controlling its flow.
In the information era, the law has continued to play its traditional role in
granting rights and regulating behavior in relation to valuable resources —
but increasingly the resource is information itself. The idea of a constitution
of information evokes a particular vision of legal rights held by individuals
over information — including rights over the intangible works in which
information is found. The focus of this Article is on the law’s allocation of
rights over information resources through the particular vehicle of copyright
law. Specifically, it is concerned with how the law’s allocation and enforcement
of copyright responds (or refuses to respond) to technological change — and
to the shifting dynamics of information, creativity and communication that
such change entails.
There is nothing new about the fundamental nature of “information” or the
simple fact of its creation and exchange that sets this so-called information
era apart from its predecessors. The nature of our relationship to the creative
works in which information is found, however, has always been informed
by the technologies available for capturing and sharing these works. Thus it
was the development of the printing press that precipitated the emergence
of rules governing the printing of literary works; and it was the proliferation
of affordable printing technologies that provoked into existence the modern
copyright system.
In the past quarter century or so, the “digital shift” and the emergence and
rapid proliferation of network technologies has again dramatically changed
how we capture and share creative works, thereby altering in perceptible
ways the value of information and its significance in our lived experiences.1
The laws that have governed ownership over such informational “things” for
hundreds of years have correspondingly swelled in importance to become a
central component (and core determinant) of our information ecosystem. We
should ask ourselves whether they merit this prominence2: are our copyright
laws capable of appropriately allocating rights and protecting privileges in the
information era, or are they playing a role in the allocation of power that could
never have been anticipated — and cannot, now, be satisfactorily justified?
It is with this question in mind that I hope to advance, in these pages, a
fairly modest claim: if copyright’s centrality in our evolving information
1
2

Cf. Niva Elkin-Horen, Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 309, 321 (2011).
Cf. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (2d ed. 2006).
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ecosystem is to be justified, copyright law must at least be capable of adapting
to the changing realities of information — changes in its flow, its value, and
its role in human (economic, cultural and social) relations — that are the
inevitable result of technological development. Copyright law must therefore
be capable of changing with technology.
This assertion may seem on its face to be at odds with the widely-touted
principle of “technological neutrality,” according to which laws should
be developed to be independent of any particular technology. Rather than
changing in response to specific technological developments, goes the logic,
our laws should rise above such reactivity to ensure the consistency and
sustainability of regulations over time and across technologies. Seen in this
way, the objective of our lawmakers should be to transcend the vagaries of
technological innovation for the sake of both regulatory efficiency and, in a
larger sense, the rule of law itself.3 To the contrary, I suggest, an appropriate
understanding of technological neutrality necessitates active responsiveness
to changing technologies. As a principled approach to copyright law, true
technological neutrality should stand in stark contrast to what we might call
“technology blindness.”4 Copyright laws that are essentially blind to the
differences between old and new technologies can create massive inequalities
between technologies, and their objectively “neutral” application will produce
very different results over time. We should know by now that ostensibly neutral
legal norms can render important differences invisible, and thereby fail to
produce substantive equality between the differently situated. In copyright
law, I argue, substantive equality between technologies requires shifting and
adjusting the allocation, nature and scope of rights in order to consistently
pursue the goals of copyright through the choppy currents of technological
change. What is needed, in other words, is not technology blindness but a
continuous process of “equilibrium adjustment” as technologies evolve.5 Real
technological neutrality sustains a normative equilibrium in the face of change.
3

4

5

See Bert-Japp Koops, Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?, in
Starting Points for ICT Regulation: Deconstructing Prevalent Policy Oneliners 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops, Miriam Lips, Corien Prins & Maurice Schellekens
eds., 2006). Rule of law considerations feature largely in what Koops identifies
as Category C: the broad category of usage of “technological neutrality” related
to “legislative technique.”
Cf. Ian Hosein & Alberto Escudero Pascual, Understanding Traffic Data and
Deconstructing Technology-Neutral Regulations 8 (Working Paper, 2002),
http://www.it46.se/docs/papers/unece-latest-escuderoa-hoseini.pdf (“Attempts
to be technology-neutral should be interrogated, lest in our blindness we reduce
democratic protections and oversight under the deterministic veil of progress.”).
Cf. Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
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By casting technological neutrality in these terms, this Article seeks to draw
a connection between our conceptualization of rights over information and
our capacity to develop technologically neutral legal norms in the information
age. Ultimately, it warns that the more individualistic and rigid our vision
of legal rights, the less technologically neutral our regulation of information
is likely to be. I suggest that, in order to achieve the kind of technological
neutrality that best serves the public purposes of copyright, we need to take
a contextual and relational approach to the rights at play.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores competing conceptions
of technological neutrality and endorses what I call the “expansive” vision of
technological neutrality, which situates copyright disputes over new technologies
in the context of the overarching purposes of the copyright system. This
discussion is built primarily on an analysis of Canada’s recent Supreme Court
copyright jurisprudence on the meaning and role of technological neutrality.
Part II explores various difficulties associated with traditional rights-based
reasoning in the copyright context, showing how it supports a restrictive
and unsatisfactory approach to technological neutrality. It then sketches out
a “relational” theory of copyright law and suggests the advantages of this
approach in actively responding to new technologies. The Article concludes
that an authors’ rights-based approach to copyright obstructs rather than
facilitates the development of a technologically neutral copyright law, to
the detriment of the copyright system and, more broadly, our information
ecosystem. Fundamentally, the capacity to develop and apply law in a manner
responsive to changing technological realities requires a purposive approach to
structuring the legal relationships between people, information and technology.

I. Conceptual Approaches to Technological Neutrality
A. Introducing Technological Neutrality
As it is commonly understood, the principle of technological neutrality prescribes
that laws can and should be developed in such a way that they are independent
125 Harv. L. Rev. 426 (2011) (describing how changing technology and
social practice can destabilize the balance of police power of traditional Fourth
Amendment rules, and suggesting that courts might respond to these new facts
by adjusting legal rules to restore the preexisting balance of police power — a
response Kerr calls “equilibrium adjustment”). In similar terms, I see technological
neutrality as requiring “a case-by-case reassessment of preexisting law in light
of present-day realities” in order “to restore the status quo” of the copyright
balance. Id. at 492.
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of any particular technology, neither favoring nor discriminating against specific
technologies as they emerge and evolve. Perhaps because technologically
neutral laws hold the promise of sustainability in a time of rapid technological
change, the principle is regularly invoked as an uncontested regulatory starting
point.6 While the general wisdom seems to be that technological neutrality
is, like “motherhood and apple pie,” an unquestionably good thing, Chris
Reed has rightly cautioned that “this consensus among legislators seems to
have developed in an almost complete absence of any clear understanding
[of] what the term ‘technology neutrality’ might actually mean.”7 Similarly,
Brad Greenberg has recently observed that technological neutrality is “undertheorized and, thereby, poorly understood. While scholars frequently refer
vaguely to the principle, few have conceptualized it, and legislators have
accepted it without critical inquiry.”8
In fact, technological neutrality has many shades of meaning, and, of
course, different meanings can produce differing applications with more or
less desirable results. In this Part, drawing on a fuller analysis that I have
presented elsewhere,9 I identify what I perceive to be three different approaches
to conceptualizing technological neutrality in the copyright context, all of
which are discernable in the jurisprudence both in Canada and internationally.
I sketch out these approaches in broad terms, and then argue that the third
approach — the “expansive” interpretation — should be preferred. It avoids
the shortcomings of the more restrictive approaches and holds the key to
maintaining a normatively justifiable copyright system over time.
At the outset, however, I should acknowledge that actual technological
neutrality is not, in my view, an attainable state for copyright law; it is more
akin to a normative quest. I doubt it can truthfully be said of any law that it is
“technologically neutral,” at least as an objectively verifiable claim without
caveat. Neutrality itself is illusive — a myth too often invoked to obscure the
realities of inequality, self-interest or political agenda — and the principle
of technological neutrality is no different. As such, the three versions of the
principle to which we now turn are best understood as interpretive tools,
which have been and may be deployed in the task of applying copyright law
6
7
8
9

Koops, supra note 3, at 77-78.
Chris Reed, Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality, 4 SCRIPT-ed 263, 265
(2007).
Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1495,
1498 (2016).
See Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of
Copyright Law, in The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of
Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law 271 (Michael
Geist ed., 2013).
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in new technological circumstances.10 None can produce a law that transcends
technological realities; each offers a route by which to reason about how the
law ought to apply. (And each, of course, has the potential to serve specific
interests, and advance particular agendas.)
B. Three Approaches to Technological Neutrality
I argue that there are essentially three conceptual approaches to technological
neutrality, which I have labelled the restrictive, intermediate and expansive
approaches. With these labels, I mean to describe the scope of the principle
as understood: what it is that we can see, and what we focus on, when we
look at copyright law through the lens of technological neutrality. A restrictive
approach to technological neutrality takes the narrowest view, zooming in
to focus on the words of the statute and the technical activities at issue.
With this lens, we can simply seek to apply the law as written to the new
technological activity. The intermediate approach broadens its focus, pulling
out the metaphorical lens a little in order to capture a wider frame: with this
lens, we can see not just the activity but the end result of the activity, or the
function it performs. We can then seek to apply the law in a “functionally
equivalent” way; that is, applying it equally to new technologies having the
same function or effect as older technologies. Finally, the expansive approach
pulls out still further, until it captures within its wide-angle frame not only
the specific activity and its function or effect, but also where this activity fits
within the broader context of the copyright system and its purposes. With
an expansive understanding of technological neutrality, then, we can seek to
apply the law to new technologies in a purposive manner that consistently
advances the normative goals of copyright. Without getting mired in the
technical details of particular cases, this Section identifies and describes these
competing conceptions and articulations of technological neutrality as found
in the Canadian jurisprudence.11
i. The Restrictive Approach: Formal Nondiscrimination
The first approach to technological neutrality in copyright law is what I call
the “restrictive approach”: it has a narrow focus on the words of the statute and
the specific technological activities undertaken by the defendant. Its purpose
is to ensure that copyright applies to all technologies, even those unforeseen
10 I am indebted to Julie Cohen for this characterization of the three approaches
to technological neutrality that I describe as, essentially, interpretive tools.
11 For a more detailed description and analysis of the facts and ratios in each of
the key Canadian cases, see Craig, supra note 9.
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technologies that could not have been within the contemplation of the legislative
drafters. While broad in its potential reach, the approach is restrictive insofar
as it is concerned only with the extension of copyright’s exclusive rights to
new technologies notwithstanding the differences between the new and old.
It is aimed at ensuring the continued capacity of rights-holders to control and
exploit protected works on new platforms and in new media. When regarded
as such, the concept is effectively synonymous with “media neutrality,” and
finds its grounding, in the Canadian context, in the copyright owner’s right of
reproduction “in any material form.”12 An unauthorized reproduction, whether
made by copying by hand, by photocopier, camera or computer, triggers the
reproduction right for copyright purposes.13 The approach is “means-oriented”
in the sense that it is concerned with the application of law to new technical
means for using and exploiting protected works. Taking this approach, one is
likely to adopt what Brad Greenberg calls the “internal perspective”: looking
inside a machine or process to identify infringing activities rather than focusing
on the outputs of technological processes.14
In the Canadian jurisprudence, the basic expression of this restrictive
approach to technological neutrality is found in the dissenting judgment of
Justice Rothstein in Entertainment Software Association (ESA) v. Society of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada15: “Media neutrality means
that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different media, including
more technologically advanced ones.”16 This statement reflects a narrow
vision of technological neutrality as concerned only with nondiscrimination
between technological means in a formalistic sense: the law remains equally
applicable across different technologies. The emphasis is not on the effect
of the law as such, or the effects of technological change, but on the law’s
extension to new contexts. Thus, the author of a newspaper article can control
its reproduction in an electronic database, and the copyright owner in a
12 See Gregory R. Hagen, Technological Neutrality in Canadian Copyright Law,
in The Copyright Pentalogy, supra note 9, at 307, 314-15.
13 Cf. Brad Greenberg, Aereo and the Spirit of Technology Neutrality, Concurring
Opinions, http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/aereo-and-the-spiritof-technology-neutrality.html (last visited 29 Apr., 2015).
14 Greenberg, supra note 8, at 1537.
15 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 (Can.) (concluding that the download
of a videogame containing a musical work constituted a “communication by
telecommunication” of that work for which compensation was due).
16 Id. ¶ 121. Justice Rothstein was quoting from the majority ruling in Robertson v.
Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶ 49 (Lebel & Fish JJ. writing for Bastarache,
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish & Rothstein JJ.) (Can.).
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musical work should be recompensed when a copy is transmitted online.17
The underlying assumption is that the legal rights recognized in respect of
the old technology must be equally worthy of recognition and protection in
the new technological setting.
To the extent that broader policy concerns are considered in this restrictive
neutrality analysis, the concern tends to be with the continued recognition
and protection of authors’ or owners’ rights as technologies change, with a
view to ensuring the owner’s continued ability to exploit the work, even in
new ways and in unforeseen markets. This is clear in the dictum endorsed by
Justice Rothstein, who continues: “Media neutrality is not a license to override
the rights of authors — it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as
technology evolves.”18 The restrictive approach thus tends to be invoked (or
at least implicitly at play) when finding infringement by users of new media.
In keeping with this approach, in the recent case of Canadian Broadcasting
Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc.,19 Justice Rothstein, now writing for the majority,
emphasized that the principle of technological neutrality, though “central to
Canadian copyright law, . . . cannot change the express terms of the Copyright
Act.”20 The case involved “broadcast-incidental” digital copies of works
made to facilitate licensed broadcasting. The Court held that such copies
were reproductions like any other, and so engaged the reproduction right as
would any non-exempted copy, based simply on the plain language of the
statute. Differences between broadcast-incidental copying practices in analog
and digital contexts would not justify treating digital copies differently: seen
through the restrictive lens, then, the law as written simply extends into the
new technological context, treating a copy as a copy.
ii. The Intermediate Approach: Functional Equivalence
What I have called the “intermediate approach” to technological neutrality
gives a broader significance to the concept. It is concerned not simply with
equal treatment of rights across technologies, but with achieving similar
outcomes for functionally equivalent technological processes. Whereas the
restrictive version of the principle demands only that “the Copyright Act
should continue to apply in different media,”21 an intermediate approach such
17
18
19
20
21

Robertson, [2006] S.C.C.; Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA), [2012] S.C.C. (Rothenstein,
LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 49.
Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 (Can.).
Id. ¶ 51; see Gregory Hagen, Interpreting the Right of Reproduction in SODRAC,
Intell. Prop. J. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that this ruling reflected an unduly
restrictive approach to the role of principle in statutory interpretation).
Robertson, [2006] S.C.C. at ¶ 49.
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as that adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada aims to ensure that
the law is applied “in a way that operates consistently” across different media,
“regardless of the form of media involved, or its technological sophistication.”22
The emphasis is not on formal nondiscrimination between technologies, but
rather on achieving substantive equivalence of effect when the law is applied
across different technologies. In this case, the Court declined to assess the
“amount” of the use in a fair dealing analysis based on the aggregate number
of music samples streamed to consumers because to do so would disadvantage
digital dealings, thereby undermining the goal of technological neutrality. The
formulation offered by Justice Abella and accepted by the full bench in the
Bell case thus suggests a more functional and effects-oriented approach to
technological neutrality, ensuring that no effective disadvantage is suffered
by those who make use of new technological means.23
Because it is effects-oriented, the perspective adopted for the intermediate
approach is typically “external” in focus: looking to what the technology
accomplishes rather than the technical processes involved in producing the
outcome. Another way to think of this is to view the technology as a “black
box” whose internal contents are invisible: what matters to the decisionmaker is what goes in, and what comes out. The external perspective, then,
“looks only at the technological output — at what, not how,”24 and thus
avoids many of the pitfalls of technical specificity (not the least of which is
technical complexity beyond the ken of the average lawyer or judge). Thus,
in Rogers v. SOCAN, the Supreme Court treated on-demand streaming as a
performance in public, analogous to traditional broadcasting, notwithstanding
the technical differences between “push” and “pull” technologies: “If the
nature of the activity in both cases is the same, albeit accomplished through
different technical means, there is no justification for distinguishing between
the two for copyright purposes.”25
22 Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Bell Can. [2012]
S.C.C. 36 ¶ 43 (Can.).
23 In Bell, the Court expressed concern that, for the purposes of conducting a fair
dealing analysis, assessing the “amount” of dealing in light of the aggregate
amount of uses would lead to disproportionate findings of unfairness in respect
of dealings with digital as opposed to non-digital works. Such an interpretation,
it was said, would undermine the goal of technological neutrality in copyright
law. Id.
24 Greenberg, supra note 8, at 1537 (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective
in Internet Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 357, 357 (2003)).
25 Rogers Communications, Inc. v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 35 ¶ 29 (Rothstein J.).
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The intermediate approach differs from the restrictive approach to the extent
that it engages with policy considerations beyond merely the reach of copyright
protection. As the Bell case demonstrates, the intermediate approach, in its
quest for functional equivalence, looks not only to the extension of owners’
rights but also justifies the extension of users’ rights (in the form of defenses
and exceptions to infringement26) to achieve a technologically neutral result.
In this way, it offers, at least potentially, a far more nuanced analysis of what
technological neutrality ought to entail in particular circumstances.
Because the goal is to achieve substantively equivalent results across
different media, fairness to all parties means not disadvantaging users for
employing new or more sophisticated technologies to achieve equivalent
ends. This permits, at least notionally, the possibility of different treatment
for substantively different technologies in order to ensure an equivalent result.
Whereas, for example, traditional broadcasting techniques required the making
of only a few incidental copies, the vastly inflated number of reproductions
involved in digital broadcasting may necessitate different treatment of those
copies. So, having held that broadcast-incidental digital copies trigger the
reproduction right, the Court in CBC proceeded to apply the principle of
technological neutrality to the valuation of the royalties payable in respect of
such copies. This aspect of the majority reasons adopts what is arguably an
intermediate approach, in the sense that it focuses on the outcome or effect of
the use (albeit in value-based terms) and seeks to ensure that commensurate
legal obligations attach to an act of equivalent (economic) effect: “[I]n the
valuation of a right, technological neutrality requires that different technologies
using reproductions of copyright protected work that produce the same value
to the users should be treated the same way.”27

26 See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.C. 13, [2004]
1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.) (the Supreme Court of Canada first declaring that “exceptions
to copyright infringement” were “more properly understood as users’ rights”)
(emphasis added).
27 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶ 72. The
passage continues: “Conversely, different technologies using reproductions that
produce different values should not be treated the same way. . . . Technological
neutrality requires that the Board compare the value derived from the use
of reproduction in the two technologies in its valuation analysis.” Id. ¶ 72.
Respectfully, the majority erred, in my view, by relegating consideration of
technological neutrality to the valuation of royalties. The vehicle of tariff-setting
involves a market-driven assessment of the value of licensed copies, while
technological neutrality should guide the analysis of whether such copies need
to be licensed at all.

2016] Technological Neutrality: Recalibrating Copyright in the Information Age 611

The intermediate and restrictive approaches to technological neutrality
can produce very different — sometimes contradictory — conclusions about
the appropriate application of copyright doctrine in particular cases. The
intermediate approach avoids some, but not all, of the limitations inherent
in the restrictive approach to technological neutrality. Rather than simply
protecting rights across different or previously unanticipated media, it seeks
to avoid discriminating between functionally equivalent technologies. The
analysis is therefore geared towards achieving substantively equal treatment of
new technologies, at least where a functionally equivalent process previously
existed: activities with equivalent outcomes receive similar legal treatment.
Cast in these terms, however, the analysis remains rooted in the specific
activity in question and its immediate effect. Where it is possible to say that
one activity is functionally equivalent to another, this provides a shortcut to a
technology-neutral conclusion.28 But it is not always possible to compare one
analog activity to a digital one, and not all technological advances proceed
in so linear or parallel a fashion. The reliance upon technological analogy is
often unhelpful, being capable of producing conflicting but equally credible
arguments that lead inexorably to incompatible conclusions. The recent case of
American Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo, Inc. affords a good example.29 Reliance
upon technological analogy permitted the ultimately successful argument that
the one-to-one transmission of a digitized signal was sufficiently “cable-like”
to constitute public performance and attract liability in the same way as would
a cable transmission. A conflicting but compelling technological analogy was
available to support the argument that the defendant’s digital time-shifting
service was functionally equivalent, if technically superior, to the traditional
VCR, and should thus be treated similarly in law (i.e., as a means of carrying
out a personal, non-infringing use).30 The competing but apt analogies in this
case merely begged the question.
The choice of analogy may, then, have the unfortunate effect of appearing
to require a particular conclusion, when really the desired conclusion requires
a particular choice of analogy. Worse still, use of analogy to compare activities
across technologies is often misleading, causing the decision-maker to overlook
differences and fail to perceive the larger paradigm shifts that occur through the
28 See Deborah S. Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and
New Technologies, 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 427, 479 (2005).
29 Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
30 Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors and Scholars in Support of Respondents,
at 22-23, Am. Broad. Co., 134 S. Ct., http://isp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/
American%20Broadcasting%20Companies%20v.%20Aereo.pdf (citing Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
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iterative process of technological advancement.31 By contrast, the “expansive”
approach to technological neutrality is less concerned with finding analogous
processes or equivalent effects in particular instances, and more concerned
with finding an appropriate resolution in light of changing technological
realities and overarching policy concerns.
iii. The Expansive Approach: Prescriptive Parallelism
The expansive approach to technological neutrality operates as a guiding
principle that informs the application of copyright law to new technologies:
fundamentally, the principle is one of “prescriptive parallelism,” meaning that
the balance of rights traditionally sought in copyright law should be preserved
in new technological environments.32 What must remain equal in respect of
new technology, then, is not the treatment of particular, potentially analogous,
activities as such. Rather, what must be consistent across technologies is
the application of core copyright concepts and doctrine in a manner that
appropriately balances the rights and interests at stake — maintaining, in the
face of technical change, the steady pursuit of copyright’s policy goals. It
therefore requires doctrinal adaptability as the copyright balance is continually
recalibrated in response to new developments. The expansive approach to
technological neutrality as a guiding principle is neither primarily means- nor
effects-oriented, but purpose-oriented. It supports substantive nondiscrimination
between functional equivalents, writ large: it seeks outcomes to copyright cases
that preserve the balance of rights in the digital realm. In this sense, technological
neutrality operates as a framing principle, demanding a purposive or teleological
application of old laws to new situations. Moreover, it necessitates not willful
technology-blindness, but a clear-sighted recognition of the disruptive force
and political significance of technological change.
This expansive vision of technological neutrality is also discernable in
Canada’s Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Robertson, which concerned
the electronic archiving of newspaper articles, the minority described the
electronic database as functionally equivalent to a library collection of printed

31 If, for example, the writing of fan fiction has been fundamentally transformed by
the establishment of online communities for sharing and peer review, analogizing
fan-ficcing to the offline activities of reading groups or writing clubs risks
missing the point. See Betsy Rosenblatt & Rebecca Tushnet, Transformative
Works: Young Women’s Voices on Fandom and Fair Use, in eGirls, eCitizens
385, 388 (Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves eds., 2015).
32 Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & P. Samuelson, A Reverse Notice
and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected
Copyrighted Works, 22 Berkeley Tech L.J. 981 (2007).
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newspapers.33 Beyond such analogies, however, the dissenting judgment
articulated a principled commitment both to the purposes of copyright law
and to the promise of new technologies:
The Copyright Act was designed to keep pace with technological
developments to foster intellectual, artistic and cultural creativity. In
applying the Copyright Act to a realm that includes the Internet and
the databases at issue in this case, . . . the public benefits of this digital
universe should be kept prominently in view. As Professor Michael
Geist observes: “The Internet and new technologies have unleashed a
remarkable array of new creativity, empowering millions of individuals
to do more than just consume our culture, instead enabling them to
actively and meaningfully participate in it.”34
This broad vision supported the conclusion that the newspaper could
lawfully reproduce print editions in the searchable electronic database, allowing
the benefits of digitization to flow more freely. The expansive approach to
technological neutrality reemerged in the majority reasons of Justices Abella and
Moldaver in ESA, which analogized digital to traditional means of transferring
copies of works, describing the internet delivery of digital copies as akin
to a “technological taxi.”35 The risks of reliance on analogy were apparent
when Justice Rothstein in dissent pointedly remarked that taxis “need not
give free rides.”36 But the expansive approach to technological neutrality that
informed the majority judgment was not reducible to the identification and
like treatment of functional equivalents. Rather, the majority’s analysis built
on the broader assertion that “[t]he traditional balance between authors and
users should be preserved in the digital environment.”37
33 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶¶ 88-90 (Abella J., writing for
McLachlin C.J. & Binnie, Abella & Charron JJ.) (Can.) (“This is simply the
electronic analogy to stacking print editions of a newspaper on a shelf.”).
34 Id. ¶ 79 (citing Michael Geist, Our Own Creative Land: Cultural Monopoly &
The Trouble with Copyright 9, Lecture Given at Hart House Committee, Toronto,
Can. (Mar. 7, 2006), http://cdn.michaelgeist.ca/wp-content/uploads/2006/05/
hhl06_Online_Book.pdf).
35 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 ¶ 5 (Can.).
36 Id. ¶ 50. The majority judgment drew a less vulnerable analogy when it compared
downloading to a store clerk putting a copy of the work in the hands of the end
user.
37 Id. ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Carys Craig, Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and
Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32, in From ‘Radical Extremism’ to ‘Balanced
Copyright’: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda 177 (Michael Geist
ed., 2010)).
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With this purpose in mind, the majority found that technological neutrality
meant avoiding the imposition of “an additional layer of protections . . . based
solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user.”38 Imposing
“gratuitous costs”39 on the use of new and more efficient technologies would
upset the copyright balance in the digital environment, contrary to the principle
of technological neutrality. Rather than simply extending the communication
right to cover the online transmission, technological neutrality meant refusing
to extend copyright liability onto new “technologies and activities that,
while theoretically capable of being included under the [Copyright] Act,
only incidentally implicate copyright.”40 The Court’s expansive vision of
technological neutrality thus allowed it to limit the scope of the right to avoid
disadvantaging users of new technologies and thereby obstructing the larger
goals of the copyright system.
It is unfortunate, in my view, that the majority approach in ESA became the
minority approach in the recent CBC case, in which Justice Abella’s dissenting
reasons exemplified the expansive version of technological neutrality as I have
described it. Faced with the question of whether digital broadcast-incidental
copies should be treated as reproductions for copyright purposes, Justice
Abella situated it in the context of copyright’s purpose:
The question in this case, once again, is how to preserve [the balance
that best supports the public interest in creative works] in the face of
new technologies that are transforming the mechanisms through which
creative works are produced, reproduced and distributed. . . . The
answer to this challenge, in my view, lies in applying a robust vision
of technological neutrality as a core principle of statutory interpretation
under the Copyright Act.41
The robust vision that Justice Abella propounds combines media neutrality
(protecting “the rights of users [as well as owners] of copyrighted material across
new media”42) with functional equivalence (“focus[ing] on the essential character
of the activity and not the technical modalities by which it is achieved”43) in
the context of copyright’s purpose (“to protect the fine balance between users
38 Id. ¶ 121.
39 Id. ¶ 9.
40 See Cameron Hutchinson, Technological Neutrality Explained (& Applied to
CBC v. SODRAC) (Working Paper, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533734.
41 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 147-148
(Can.).
42 Id. ¶ 151.
43 Id. ¶ 164.
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and creators, between access and reward, enshrined in the Copyright Act.”44)
The dissenting reasons strive for substantive nondiscrimination between
functional equivalents, looking at external outcomes and effects rather than
internal processes, and taking a purposive interpretation of the statute that
“seeks to preserve the accepted balance between creators and users in the
digital environment.”45 With this expansive vision of what technological
neutrality entails, the minority concludes:
The essential character of the broadcasting activity does not change with
the adoption of modern digital technologies that are dependent on the
creation of incidental copies in order to accomplish the activity. Each
broadcast-incidental copy is not a separate reproduction of the work
under the Act simply because the technical imperatives of effecting a
broadcast require the presence of multiple copies. They do not, as a
result, attract separate royalties. To conclude otherwise is to doom both
technological neutrality and the ability of copyright law to preserve
the delicate balance between the rights of copyright holders and the
public’s interest in the dissemination of creative works.46
C. Interim Conclusion: Technological Neutrality and the Principled
Approach
To summarize, the expansive approach to technological neutrality recognizes, as
a guiding principle, that the interpretation of copyright law in new technological
contexts should maintain the appropriate balance of rights in furtherance of
copyright’s purposes. It is much broader in its vision than is the restrictive
proposition that copyright should, subject to the express terms of the statute,
extend to cover previously unknown technical means and processes. It is also
much more ambitious and flexible than the intermediate claim that copyright
should simply treat functionally equivalent actions in a similar way. Tasked
with conducting copyright’s “equilibrium adjustment,” it therefore requires
a reassessment of the law in light of present-day technological realities in
order to preserve or restore the copyright balance.
Now it might be argued that the conclusion I offer is no conclusion at
all. Is the expansive version so vague in its assertions that any application
of law might equally claim the badge of “technological neutrality”? As with
legal principles generally, it is true that technological neutrality in this sense
44 Id. ¶ 157.
45 Id. ¶ 181.
46 Id. ¶ 164.
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does not dictate a particular answer to a particular legal question.47 It does,
however, relieve us of the obsessive internal examination of technological
processes, which is, from a policy perspective, hardly worthwhile; and it
allows us to escape intractable debates about which analogies most aptly
apply to describe new technology-enabled activities. Simply put, it reminds
us of the question we should be asking: given the new realities of the current
technological environment, what rights should we recognize — and subject
to what limits — if we aim to advance the objectives of the copyright system?
It is the search for this answer that should guide the application of the law in
respect of new technologies.48
Greenberg identifies several fundamental problems associated with the
principle of technological neutrality in his well-reasoned argument against
neutrality and in favor of technological discrimination. Central among them
is the following claim:
Technology neutrality discounts, if not overlooks countervailing reasons
to avoid future-proofing and the downsides to treating differences
alike. Significantly, technology neutrality assumes the appropriateness
of old laws regulating new technologies. Yet fading normativity and
elusive neutrality . . . make technology neutrality both suboptimal and
self-defeating.49
The problems identified by Greenberg speak accurately to the difficulties
associated with the restrictive and, to a significant degree, intermediate
approaches to technological neutrality as I have attempted to describe them.50
47 At least, it does not do so for any decision-maker bar Dworkin’s Hercules.
Hutchinson, supra note 40, describes technological neutrality as a legal principle
in the sense most famously explicated by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin’s imaginary
“Hercules” is an ideal judge capable of finding, through the application of
legal rules and principles, the “right” answer to any legal problem. See Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 75, 105 (1978).
48 A common criticism of the concept of technological neutrality as employed in
Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers
of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 (Can.), is that it provides no practical guidance on
future rulings. See Can. Broad. Co. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2014 F.C.A. 84,
118 C.P.R. 79 (4th) (Can.). However, viewed as a legal principle, or simply
as an interpretative tool, the criticism is overstated. That it does not produce
a particular practical solution to a specific legal problem is not an appropriate
basis on which to dismiss a guiding principle as unhelpful.
49 Greenberg, supra note 8, at 1522-23.
50 Greenberg identifies four core problems: Prediction (legislators cannot know
whether and to what extent current laws should regulate new and unpredictable

2016] Technological Neutrality: Recalibrating Copyright in the Information Age 617

Thus, for example, the simple “ex ante application of the law to new technologies”
that is envisioned in the restrictive approach wrongly “assumes that subjecting
extant and future technologies to copyright liability imposes the same costs
and benefits to the copyright system and to society.”51 Neither the intermediate
nor the expansive versions of technological neutrality, however, should permit
one to “overlook the possibility that different technologies warrant different
treatment, [thereby] mistaking equal application for equivalence.”52 To the
extent that a narrow approach to technological neutrality may, as Greenberg
argues, fail to account for new technological uses that “disrupt the policies
Congress previously balanced,”53 avoiding such disruption to the policy
balance is precisely the point of the expansive approach. Moreover, there is
no “pretense” of value-neutrality in the expansive approach. At its core lies
the recognition that our copyright law reflects a particular understanding of
the value of rewarding authors and encouraging creativity and dissemination
of works. It directs attention to these normative assumptions rather than
obscuring them, paving the way for a more open and fruitful debate about
which norms should apply.
The problems that Greenberg rightly identifies do not, then, necessitate
the abandonment of technological neutrality in its expansive conception, nor
undermine its principled significance. Technological neutrality in the expansive
sense permits (indeed demands) that the law recognize, respond and adapt
(sometimes in technologically specific ways) to new and disruptive or paradigmshifting technologies, rather than holding fast to previous legal constructs and
reasoning by analogy. In my view, however, to abandon technological neutrality
as an overarching principle would be to abandon the powerful notion that we
must recalibrate copyright’s balance to new technological circumstances, and
maintain normative vigilance as conditions change. Copyright requires this
expansive vision of technological neutrality in order to appropriately adapt
to technological change: only through constant recalibration and equilibrium
adjustment can the law maintain the necessary balance of rights and interests
to advance its purpose, and retain its legitimacy, in the digital age.
technologies); Penumbra (the penumbra of doubt produced by technological change
creates growing uncertainly in the law); Perspective (confusion about whether
to adopt an internal or external perspective when analyzing new technological
processes produces conflicting results); and Pretense (technological neutrality is
not in fact neutral, and the pretense of neutrality obscures discrimination against
new technologies). Id. at 1498.
51 Id. at 1523.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1499.
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There is, however, a significant obstacle to this approach deeply embedded
in our traditional copyright model, and it is to this that we now turn. The
obstacle to which I refer is the common deontological commitment to copyright
as primarily an author’s right; when the author’s right appears rigid and
unchanging in the face of technological change, it inevitably limits copyright’s
capacity to respond to new realities in a teleological way. Part II explores
this connection between competing conceptions of the author’s right and
competing approaches to technological neutrality.

II. Reconceptualizing (Copy)right
A. Technological Neutrality and Rights-Based Rhetoric
My suggestion is that the restrictive approach to technological neutrality,
as described above, is bound up with the rigid adherence to the idea of the
author’s right to “own” his or her work. I have argued elsewhere that this
commitment to authorial entitlement is ill-founded from a theoretical perspective,
misunderstands the nature of authorship and expression, and unnecessarily
stifles the cultural dialogue.54 My purpose here is more limited: I mean only
to suggest, in this Section, that the rights-based approach to copyright anchors
a restrictive version of technological neutrality. As such, it has the power to
preclude the expansive approach to technological neutrality and to obstruct
the pursuit of copyright’s purposes in the digital era. In the following Section,
I propose a relational account of copyright that is more conducive to the kind
of contextual analysis contemplated by the expansive approach.
Before we proceed to look closely at the theory of copyright that best
supports technological neutrality, however, it is important to identify in specific
terms the way in which rights-based rhetoric and the value judgments about
ownership claims are tied up in cases that tackle new technologies.
i. Authors’ Rights and the Restrictive Approach to Technological Neutrality
We have already seen, in the descriptions of competing approaches to
technological neutrality, statements that reveal the values informing each
approach. Specifically, we might begin by recalling the statement that informed
both the majority ruling in Robertson and the dissent in ESA, propounding
a limited role for technological neutrality, restrictively construed: “Media
neutrality is not a licence to override the rights of authors — it exists to protect
54 See Carys J. Craig, Copyright, Communication
Relational Theory of Copyright Law (2011).
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the rights of authors and others as technology evolves.”55 The primary focus was
on protecting the rights of authors (and presumably other owners) in respect
of the new technology.56 Media neutrality in this restrictive approach can only
support, but cannot override, the extension of these ownership rights into new
technological contexts. The majority’s technological neutrality analysis in CBC
was similarly constructed around the right-holder’s entitlement to be justly
compensated for use of the right, and the assumption that any value gained
by the use of more efficient technology should flow back to the right-holder.57
The British case of TV Catchup provides another interesting example.
While not explicitly invoking the concept of media or technology neutrality,
the facts of the case directly put in issue the question of whether and how old
laws should constrain the exploitation of new markets made possible by new
technologies. The defendant in the case offered a service that permitted its users
to receive, via the internet, live streams of free-to-air television broadcasts
that they were legally entitled to watch. When referred to the European Court
of Justice, the Court approached the question with the following sentiment
front of mind:
First of all, it is to be noted that the principal objective of [the Directive]
is to establish a high level of protection of authors, allowing them to
obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, including on the
occasion of communication to the public. It follows that “communication
to the public” must be interpreted broadly . . . .58
It proceeded to rule that “each transmission or retransmission of a work
which uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be individually authorised
by the author of the work in question.”59 This was notwithstanding a previous
ruling that “a mere technical means to ensure or improve reception of the
55 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 ¶ 49 (Can.) (Lebel & Fish JJ.) (cited by
Rothstein J. ¶ 121).
56 For an interesting discussion on this theme, see Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and
Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1198, 1239 (1996).
57 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 70, 79
(Can.).
58 Case C‑607/11, on request from the High Court of England and Wales in the
matter of ITV et al. v. TV Catchup Ltd. 2013 E.C.R. I-1 ¶ 20 (citing Directive
2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society [2001] OJ L167/12) (emphasis added); cf. Case
C-325/14, SBS Belgium NV v. Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten
en Uitgevers (SABAM), [2015] WLR (D) 466 ¶ 20.
59 TV Catchup, 2013 E.C.R ¶ 24.
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original transmission within [an authorized] catchment area does not constitute
a ‘communication.’”60 The Court reasoned that this limitation did not extend
to cover a new transmission by improved means. Having prioritized the
protection of the owner’s broad communication right, the Court paid little heed
to arguments about the consumer interest in receiving the content to which
they were entitled on a superior technical platform.61 The exclusive power to
exploit the superior technical capability was reserved for the incumbent rightsholder in a manner that reflects a restrictive understanding of technological
neutrality.62
The Australian case of National Rugby League Investments Pty Limited v.
Singtel Optus Pty Ltd.63 raised a similar legal question about the lawfulness
of a cloud storage personal recording service. Optus relied on an exception
for private and domestic recording, which would permit, for example, the
video-recording of the same content for later viewing. 64 The lower court,
which accepted this argument, began its reasons by noting that “copyright
legislation has had to balance the legitimate interests of the makers of original
works and of ordinary citizens who use technological advances to copy those
works for their own use in their private or domestic lives.”65 Focusing on
balancing the various competing interests at play, and emphasizing the extent
to which “daily life of persons in Australia and many other countries has
transformed over the last 20 years with advances in technology,”66 the court
60 Id. ¶ 28 (citing Football Ass’n Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R.
I-9083 ¶ 194).
61 It held that “the intervention of such a technical means must be limited to
maintaining or improving the quality of the reception of a pre-existing transmission
and cannot be used for any other transmission.” The technical intervention
here was considered to be a “different” transmission and so not permissible
improvement. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
62 Lord Floyd of the English High Court subsequently determined that some of
the transmissions, though implicating the communication right, benefitted
from a cable retransmission defence under section 73 of the United Kingdom’s
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 c-48 (Order dated 7 October 2013).
On appeal, the English Court of Appeal made a further reference to the Court
of Justice regarding the permissible scope of the section 73 defence. [2015]
EWCA Civ 204.
63 Nat’l Rugby League Inv. Pty Ltd. v. Singtel Optus Pty Ltd., [2012] F.C.A.F.C.
59 (Austl.).
64 Copyright Act 1968, (Cth), s. 111 (Austl.).
65 Singtel Optus Pty Ltd. v. Nat’l Rugby League Inv. Pty Ltd. (No. 2), [2012]
F.C.A. 34 ¶ 58 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
66 Id. ¶ 60.
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extended the exception on the basis that the service offered is substantively
no different from a VCR or DVR. The ruling was guided by an expansive
vision of technological neutrality. Overturning this decision on appeal, the
Full Court took a narrow approach, reasoning that the consumer was not solely
responsible for making the copy, and giving short shrift to the significance of
technological neutrality as a guide to statutory interpretation of exceptions:
We are conscious that the construction which we are satisfied the language
of s 111 requires is one that is capable of excluding, and does in fact
in this instance exclude, a later technological development in copying.
However, no principle of technological neutrality can overcome what
is the clear and limited legislative purpose of s 111. It is not for this
Court to re-draft this provision to secure an assumed legislative desire
for such neutrality . . . .67
In the U.S. Aereo case, the majority similarly suggested that the extension
of copyright exceptions to new technologies is the task of the legislature: “[T]o
the extent commercial actors or other interested entities may be concerned with
the relationship between the development and use of such technologies and
the Copyright Act, they are of course free to seek action from Congress.”68 In
the absence of such action, the Court emphasized the presumed Congressional
intent to “protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo
as from those of cable companies.”69 Even in his dissenting reasons, Justice
Scalia conceded, “I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing
(or enabling to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought
not to be allowed.”70
These cases, and the way in which the rights and baseline expectations
of rights-holders are framed, all indicate, in one sense or another, a default
assumption that technological neutrality ought only to posit the extension
of an owner’s exclusive rights onto new technological means of exploiting
protected works and ensure just reward for such uses. Where an analysis of
functional equivalence threatens to support the extension of user rights or
otherwise to limit the owner’s rights in respect of exploiting the new technology,
67 Nat’l Rugby League, [2012] F.C.A.F.C. at ¶¶ 96-99. The judgment continues:
“In the present matter such are the conflicting interests and values, such are the
possible consequential considerations of which account might need to be taken
that, if a choice is to be made to extend or otherwise modify an exception such
as s 111, this requires a legislative choice to be made, not a judicial one.”
68 Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 17 (2014).
69 Id. at 13.
70 Id. at 12.
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the courts consistently retreat to the position that such limits require explicit
action by the legislature.
The implication, once again, is that copyright is primarily concerned with
the protection of authors and owners; limits and exceptions must be explicit
and clearly defined in respect of each new technological possibility, failing
which authors’ rights should continue to reach seamlessly across disruptive
technologies. This tacit assumption finds its more forthright expression in
the Brief of Amicus Curiae Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights of
the United States:
Whenever possible, when the law is ambiguous or silent on the issue at
bar, the courts should let those who want to market new technologies
carry the burden of persuasion that a new exception to the broad rights
enacted by Congress should be established. That is especially so if that
technology poses grave dangers to the exclusive rights that Congress
has given copyright owners. Commercial exploiters of new technologies
should be required to convince Congress to sanction a new delivery
system and/or exempt it from copyright liability. That is what Congress
intended.71
This argument makes explicit the unarticulated assumptions that often
inform a restrictive vision of technological neutrality. Oman begins by noting:
“There can be no serious dispute as to whether rights under the Copyright Act
are broad, subject only to specific, narrow limitations enacted by Congress
and that new developments in technology are not supposed to be able to
truncate those rights.”72 Seen in this light, the role of technological neutrality is
precisely to preserve strong authors’ rights in the face of technological change:
Congress drafted the Copyright Act to prevent the creative efforts of
authors from being usurped by new technologies. That core principle
is at the heart of the Copyright Act. Congressional intent would be
71 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights of the
United States, Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 17, http://jstyre.com/misc/Oman_
Amicus_20120921.pdf. For critical commentary on this Brief, see Kevin Smith,
Coming Clean on Technical Neutrality, Duke Univ. Library (Oct. 23, 2012), http://
blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2012/10/23/coming-clean-on-technologicalneutrality/; and Mike Masnick, Former Copyright Boss: New Technology Should
Be Presumed Illegal Until Congress Says Otherwise, Techdirt (Sept. 27, 2012),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20120927/00320920527/
former-copyright-boss-new-technology-should-be-presumed-illegal-untilcongress-says-otherwise.shtml.
72 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ralph Oman, supra note 71.
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undercut by any decision that would sanction the use of technologies
which could be used indirectly to undermine its goals.73
While these words did not find their way into the written reasons of the
Court, the Aereo ruling does reflect a similar impulse to safeguard the rights
of copyright owners against the disruptive potential of new technological uses
and users — and similarly fails to perceive any equal and opposite need to
safeguard users’ rights as technology evolves. In my view, this is technological
neutrality in its most restrictive — and least satisfactory — form. Far from
preserving the balance of copyright, it loads up only one side of the balance
with the weight to withstand technological change. The other side of the
balance is left entirely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of technology and its
exploitation. This is the flaw entailed by the traditional rights-based approach
to copyright, which prioritizes above all else the protection of the author’s
right in new technological contexts.
ii. Balancing Rights and the Public Interest: Expanding Technological
Neutrality
The cases in which technological neutrality is given a more expansive reading,
and a more central role in guiding statutory interpretation, reveal a very different
framing rhetoric that focuses on both the promise of new technologies, and
the balance or public interest purposes at the core of copyright.
We have already seen the dissenting Justices in the Canadian Robertson
case lauding the potential of digital technologies to benefit the public and
further the purposes of copyright law.74 Notably, their analysis began with a
description of the overarching purposes of copyright as “promoting the public
interest in the encouragement and dissemination of artistic and intellectual
works, and justly rewarding the creator of the work.”75 Having emphasized the
public interest in accessing archived newspapers and enjoying the “benefits
of this digital universe,” this framing principle justified limiting the authors’
rights to control reproduction of their works.76

73 Id.
74 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
75 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶ 469 (Can.) (citing, inter alia,
Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002
S.C.C. 34, ¶ 30 (Can.); CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1
S.C.R. 339, 2004 S.C.C. 13, ¶ 23 (Can.); and Soc’y of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Can. (SOCAN) v. Can. Ass’n of Internet Providers, [2004]
2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 S.C.C. 45 ¶ 40 (Can.)).
76 Robertson, [2006] S.C.C. ¶ 70.
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The majority ruling in ESA similarly emphasized the centrality of balance
in copyright, and the need to limit owners’ rights: ESA’s argument that
the communication right was not implicated by online delivery of copies
was “consistent with this Court’s caution in [Théberge], that the balance in
copyright between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works and obtaining a just reward for the creator requires
recognizing the ‘limited nature’ of creators’ rights.”77 The analysis of the
minority in CBC, which concluded that incidental copies did not implicate
the reproduction right, also began with recognition of copyright’s “careful
balance” and a warning that “tilting the balance too far towards protection
of creators’ rights would undermine the right of users to access and work
with creative materials.”78 From this perspective, the additional value or
economic gains created for users by virtue of new technologies was seen to
“have nothing to do with the copyright holder’s legitimate interests,”79 giving
rise to no additional entitlement for the right-holder.
A similar connection between a concern with copyright’s public interest
purposes and the more expansive version of technological neutrality reveals
itself in other cases beyond Canada, where courts made room for new actors to
offer new technology-enabled services to consumers. In its ruling in Football
Association Premier League v. QC Leisure, for example, the European Court
of Justice wrote, with regard to the transient copying exception in Article
5(1) of the Information Society Directive, that it “must allow and ensure the
development and operation of new technologies and safeguard a fair balance
between the rights and interests of right holders, on the one hand, and of users
of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those new technologies,
on the other.”80 With this concept of balance to the fore, it ruled that acts of
reproduction performed within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a
television screen fall within the exception and can therefore be carried out
without the authorization of the copyright holders concerned.
In RecordTV v. Mediacorp TV,81 Singapore’s Court of Appeal held that
an “internet digital video recorder” for free-over-the-air content “did not
77 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34, ¶ 7 (Abella & Moldaver JJ.) (Can.)
(emphasis added).
78 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 145-147
(Can.).
79 Id. ¶ 182.
80 C-403/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC Leisure and C-429/08, Karen
Murphy v. Media Protection Serv. Ltd. ¶ 164 (joined cases) (citing Directive
2001/29/EC, supra note 58).
81 RecordTV Pte Ltd. v. MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd., [2010] S.G.C.A. 43 (Sing.).
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communicate” the plaintiff’s broadcasts to the public and was non-infringing.
The Singapore Court framed its doctrinal analysis in the following purposive
terms:
In our view, where the Copyright Act is unclear as to how much copyright
protection ought to be granted to a copyright owner, the courts should
not be quick to construe a statutory provision so liberally as to deter
or restrict technological innovations by preventing them from being
applied in a manner which would benefit the public without harming
the rights of the copyright owner. . . .
[T]he present appeal requires us to balance the competing interests
of several stakeholders (viz, consumers, content providers as well as
technology and service vendors) in a manner which would result in
the most benefits to and impose the least costs on society as a whole.82
Emerging from these judgments, I believe, is a simple but illuminating
idea: the more committed a decision maker is to protecting authors’ rights
as the primary purpose of copyright law, the more content she will be with
a restrictive approach to technological neutrality; correspondingly, the more
committed a decision maker is to the notion that the core principle of copyright
is balancing author and user rights for the benefit of society as a whole, the
more expansive her vision of technological neutrality becomes. With this idea
in mind, my goal, in the next Section, is to suggest why traditional rights-based
reasoning obstructs the path to substantive technological neutrality — and
to briefly sketch an alternative relational approach that could better pave the
way for copyright’s future. It is not possible here, of course, to provide a full
account of what a relational approach to copyright might mean.83 I do hope,
however, to at least join the dots between a more relational understanding of
copyright and the expansive vision of a technology-neutral copyright system.
B. Relational Rights and the Evolving Role of Copyright Law
In the liberal constitutional tradition, the language of rights has evolved to
capture the notion that there are certain basic rights that no government can
violate.84 Fundamental to this notion is the idea that these rights are immutable
82 Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
83 I have begun to more fully explore a relational theory of copyright and how
it might be engaged to reshape core elements of copyright doctrine in Craig,
supra note 54, at 50-59.
84 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy,
and Law 238 et seq. (2011).
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and stable across time and place, and cannot be eroded or overridden by
democratic will or shifting social morals.85 Rights, in this sense, serve the
protective function of guarding individuals, and safeguarding their entitlements,
against the wants, interests and subjective values of others. The right to
free speech, for example, is protected even as the speaker’s views become
less popular or more offensive to others over time. And as communication
technologies evolve, that right extends not only to speech communicated in
printed text or from the proverbial soapbox, but also to speech disseminated
over new broadcasting media and in online spaces.86 Core to the liberal
notion of the basic constitutional right is its capacity to transcend time and
circumstance, thereby staking claim to something universal and unerring.
Rights are thus reified as fixed entities.87
It is not surprising, then, that the author’s claim to right — the proprietary
right over the fruits of his creative labor — so often asserted or implicitly
assumed in the context of our Western liberal copyright system, should perform
a similar function of preserving and protecting an established entitlement in
the face of changing circumstances and shifting social values.88 The celebrated
immutability of the right-claim is, however, precisely the problem for a rightsoriented copyright system trying to adapt to new technological challenges.
Standing firm and unshifting in the face of technological change, the copyright
claim-to-right refuses to bend and alter in response to technological evolution.
It demands to be upheld and protected notwithstanding the many ways in
which time and technology have come to challenge its purpose. This is what
we have seen in the case law that invokes technological neutrality in its most
minimalist form, as an interpretive tool to produce the strongest protection
for the owner’s right. The ingrained notion of rights as trumps supports the
triumph of copyright over conflicting interests of both users and providers
of new technologies, as well as, potentially, the broader public interest in
creative innovation. The vision of a technologically neutral copyright law as
I have described it — responsive to change, recalibrating rights and interests,
85 See Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13
Oxford. J. Legal Stud. 18 (2013).
86 See William E. Lee, Books, Video Games, and Foul-Mouthed Hollywood
Glitteratae: The Supreme Court and the Technology Neutral Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 14 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 295 (2013).
87 See Nedelsky, supra note 84, at 250; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Critique
of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in Left Legalism/Left Critique 178 (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
88 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287
(1988); see also Simon Stern, From Author’s Right to Property Right, 62 U.
Toronto L.J. 29 (2012).
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extending or restraining itself as its purposes demand — is obstructed by the
prevailing conception of rights on which our copyright system so often relies.89
The rhetoric of authors’ rights casts copyright as an individual’s natural
entitlement, not amenable to pragmatic or principled alteration in the name
of a broader public interest.90 Acknowledging, however, that claims of justice
and fairness regarding artistic expression typically and increasingly do find
their articulation in claims of rights (whether to property or free speech,
copyright or users’ rights), then perhaps energies are better spent debating “not
whether but how the language of rights will be used.”91 If the invocation of the
author’s right stands in the way of expansive technological neutrality, perhaps
technological neutrality needs a different understanding of the author’s right.
A relational approach to rights analyzes legal rights in terms of the way
they structure relationships. Pointing to the ever changing and continually
contested nature of even basic rights such as property or equality, Jennifer
Nedelsky regards rights as “a particular institutional and rhetorical means of
expressing, contesting, and implementing . . . values,” where value means
“any of the big abstractions used to articulate what a given society sees as
essential to humanity or to the good life for its members.”92 Included within
such values might be, for example, liberty, autonomy, freedom of expression
and, indeed, “scope for individual and/or collective artistic expression.”93
Since legal rights are the institutional implementation of societal values, the
relational approach to resolving a rights dispute begins by asking how the law
is structuring the relevant relations implicated in the dispute. It then proceeds
to identify the values at stake; to ask what kinds of relationships would foster
those values; and to consider how competing versions of the relevant right
could structure those relationships in different ways.
Importantly, a relational approach to copyright recognizes and accepts
that both the meaning of rights and the shared or common understanding of
society’s core values change over time.94 As Nedelsky explains, “[a] focus
on relationship automatically turns one’s attention to context and makes
sense of the commonly held belief that there are some basic human values
and that how we articulate and foster those values varies significantly over
time and place.”95 It must also be attentive to the reality that core values are
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Sterk, supra note 56.
Cf. Craig, supra note 54, at 86.
Nedelsky, supra note 84, at 235.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 246.
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“disproportionately articulated and enforced by some powerful subset of
the members of the society.”96 The relational approach thus demands broad
access to platforms of public deliberation about society’s core values, and
accepts that these values remain a site of constant contestation and possible
transformation.
So what values might be said to be at stake in disputes about copyright
and the new technological means by which it is exploited? The scope for
individual creative expression is certainly implicated in debates about the
claims to copyright protection in novel contexts. If, and to the extent that,
protecting the owner’s copyright will continue to provide a necessary incentive
or reward for artistic creativity in the digital age, proprietary relations between
authors and users may be said to advance that value.97 Other relationships
and other social values will also be at play, however, and these may benefit
from competing versions of rights that would structure relations in alternative,
nonproprietary ways.98 Particular circumstances such as we have seen in the
case law implicate other relations between, for example, corporate service
providers and their customers, authors and publishers, creators and their
audiences, users and their peers. As for the social values at stake, we might
consider the progress of science or capacity for technological innovation, the
scope for collective artistic expression or creative exchange, the freedom of
expression, the value of cultural or creative community engagement, access
to knowledge and information, education, equality, and so on.
As such, when we ask how the owner’s copyright should be applied in a
new technological context, we ought to ask how different available versions
of the copyright interest could structure the relationships between affected
parties differently (authors and users, consumers and service providers,
etc.). We would then consider how structuring these relationships differently
(shifting obligations, protecting privileges and freedoms, allowing competition,
facilitating cooperation, etc.) would foster values such as supporting artistic
creativity, furthering progress of the arts, protecting free expression, promoting
a vibrant public domain, and so forth. As with the expansive approach to
technological neutrality, the point is not to produce a particular answer for
a specific case, but to ask the important questions that ought to be asked in
96 Id. at 243.
97 Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 75, 88-89 (2004); see also Robert P. Merges,
Justifying Intellectual Property (2011).
98 Nedelsky’s fourth step in the relational approach is “to determine how competing
versions of a right would structure relations differently.” Nedelsky, supra note
84, at 236.
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arriving at the best answer in the given context. As our lens pulls out to reveal
relationships other than plaintiff versus defendant, and values other than
simply protecting authors, there will be circumstances in which reinforcing
proprietary relations, based on the power to exclude, will not suitably foster the
social values at stake. In such cases, the legal dispute will not be appropriately
resolved simply by recognizing and enforcing the owner’s copyright in the new
technological context (as the restrictive approach to technological neutrality
might have us believe).
Copyright, it should be stressed, is not a primary value in itself, but a
means by which to foster social values (in Nedelsky’s terms, a “second-order
value”): with respect to other rights and values it should therefore be treated as
instrumental and not fundamental.99 Copyright ought to foster free expression,
for example, and cannot be given primacy over it. In disputes over copyright,
we should examine the context of the dispute, the social values represented
and implemented through copyright, and then ask whether the extension of
copyright, its limitation, or the recognition of a countervailing user’s right,
would best foster those values. As I see it, this line of inquiry closely mirrors
the kind of contextual and dynamic approach to interpreting and applying
copyright law that I have portrayed as essential to a substantively technologyneutral copyright system.
Thus, in Robertson, for example, the minority reasons described the
relationship between freelance authors and publishers in the context of the
larger public interest in archived newspapers as a resource, noting that the
shared “interests of teachers, students, writers, reporters, and researchers” in
using the materials were “hang[ing] in the balance between the competing rights
of the two groups of creators in this case, the authors and the publishers.”100
These passages implicitly invoked the social values at stake in the dispute
— education, pursuit of knowledge, access to information — revealing
an awareness of how the authors’ rights-claim, by restricting access and
dissemination, might impede pursuit of those values. In ESA, the majority
concerned itself with the relationship between consumers and distributors,
invoking efficiency and competition as attendant social values, and refusing
99 Cf. Nedelsky, supra note 84, at 255 (describing property as a “second-order
value” that “should be treated as instrumental to both rights and values, not as
a primary value or a fundamental right”). Notably, Nedelsky’s reluctance to use
property as the focal point of rights stems from the strong connection between
property and boundaries, while her relational account rejects boundaries in favor
of relationships. Id. at 130-34. Copyright as intellectual property suffers from
the same focus on legally constructed boundaries.
100 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶ 70 (Can.).
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to construct a relationship between the collective society and distributors that
would undermine these values.101 In CBC, Justice Abella’s dissent invoked
the value of efficiency and innovation, looking at the relationship between
the public broadcaster, multiple collectives, and the creators of musical
works. She attempted to interpret the reproduction right in a way that would
structure the relationships to foster rather than punish efficiencies generated
by technological innovation.102 While none of these judgments completely or
consciously adopts a relational approach as such, an appreciation of affected
relationships and their implications for the core social values that copyright
reflect is apparent in the reasoning of all of the cases we have considered
as examples of expansive technological neutrality, almost by definition. In
these cases, the emphasis is not on individual rights and the enforcement of
legal boundaries, but on the public purposes of the law, and the question of
when — and subject to what limits — to structure the parties’ relationship
around the power to exclude and exploit.
As we saw in Section II.A., when copyright is applied to new technological
contexts, invoking the author’s right as the primary concern foretells a restrictive
approach to technological neutrality: it is the perceived task of the decisionmaker simply to ensure that the right continues to be protected in novel
circumstances. In cases where courts have expressly regarded authors’ rights not
in isolation but in relation to other rights and interests (balancing the owner’s
rights with users’ rights, typically with reference to the public interest and/or
the interests of the innovator/competitor or consumer/citizen), we have seen a
more expansive and substantive concept of technological neutrality emerge.
The connection between a more nuanced and relational understanding of
copyright and a more expansive vision of technological neutrality seems clear.
Expansive technological neutrality may require either extending or restaining
copyright in new contexts in order to strike an appropriate balance, serving
the purposes of copyright and fostering the social values that it represents.
Copyright’s limits (as with all reasonable limits to rights in the relational model)
“cannot be specified in advance; they are, implicitly, open-ended and shifting,
requiring judgment and debate.”103 This dynamic capacity to shift and change
in response to changing circumstances — including the ability to limit rights
and reshape legal relations — is vital to attaining technological neutrality in
any real sense. A more relational approach to copyright can help build that
101 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 ¶¶ 9, 11 (Can.).
102 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 129, 169
(Can.).
103 Nedelsky, supra note 84, at 246.
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capacity. A rigid commitment to guarding the boundaries of authors’ rights,
on the other hand, forecloses such flexibility. Established rights can readily
be imposed upon new technologies (it is not hard, after all, to find that a copy
is a copy, a transmission is a communication, ownership is ownership), but
they can just as readily upset the copyright balance and undermine the shared
values that such rights ought to reflect.

Conclusion
From the time of Gutenberg to the digital era of Generation Z, the manner in
which we create and exchange information has evolved in dramatic ways, at
sporadic but frequently alarming rates, and in often unanticipated directions.
Developments in our information and communication technologies have
enabled more rapid, diverse and far-reaching information flows, reshaping
our cultural landscape, changing patterns of human relationships, and shifting
social values. If legal rights are to construct relationships that reflect social
values, then these legal rights cannot be rigid and unmoving, but must shift
and change as new technologies change us.
As one of the primary legal vehicles by which we regulate the controlled
exchange of information resources, copyright law has become, rightly or
wrongly, central to our evolving information system. As I have suggested,
however, our copyright system lacks a consistent or concerted approach to
responding to disruptive innovations in information technology. A firm adherence
to protecting owners’ rights (and safeguarding established proprietary and
economic relationships) has frequently produced a restrictive understanding
of technological neutrality: rights are simply protected and extended without
sufficient regard to changes in the technological means of their exploitation.
Others, committed to ensuring consistency of outcome in the application of
copyright law across technologies, have made efforts to apply the law equally
to functionally equivalent acts. This search for a more substantive equality
amongst old and new technologies has been guided by a more robust version
of technological neutrality, to be sure. To focus on the outcome of particular
activities and the past application of existing doctrine, however, is still unduly
narrow. In contrast, I have identified (and commended) a more purposive
understanding of technological neutrality. This approach takes an expansive
view of the activity at issue, situated in the new technological context, and
asks how the law ought to apply if it is to further the purposes of the copyright
system. The consistency sought is not consistency in the application of the
law, but in the steady pursuit of its normative objectives recalibrating the
copyright balance as conditions change.
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This version of technological neutrality necessitates an understanding of
copyright and other legal rights at issue in the context of the relations that have
generated the problem. It requires the decision-maker to ask how these rights
will shape the relevant relations, and whether those relations will advance the
social values at stake in our copyright system. It may be that other versions of
copyright, users’ rights or other rights and interests will produce new patterns
of relationships that better serve these values.
Seen in this way, technological neutrality is not the state of being independent
of and immune to technological flux; indeed, there is no law — and no person
— that can claim such a state. Rather, it is a guiding principle, encouraging
us to ask how the development and application of our laws can consistently
foster the social values we consider essential, even in the face of such flux.

